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Research Division. However, I retain full respon-
sibility for errors.
Here is my plan of attack. I’ll begin with a bit
of background material to set the stage for the
analysis that follows. Next I’ll discuss monetary
policy implementation, which works through
the bond market, which is one of the economy’s
important asset markets. Following that discus-
sion, I’ll emphasize the information to be gleaned
from asset markets. The informational value of
these markets stems fundamentally from the fact
that asset markets are forward-looking, and the
central bank must also be forward-looking. Finally,
I’ll take up the issue of whether the stock market
should be a direct object of monetary policy. To
end the suspense, I want to make clear that I am
a one-armed economist on this issue. My answer
is no, no, a thousand times no, the central bank
ought not to target the stock market itself.
BACKGROUND
In the 17-month period from April 2000
through August 2001, the U.S. stock market lost
roughly a quarter of its value as measured by the
Wilshire 5000, the broadest stock market index.
By the end of August, the Wilshire 5000 had
returned to its level of November 1998. The boom-
ing stock market in the late 1990s made it easy to
finance all sorts of new enterprises, including
especially dot coms and telecoms. Many of these
companies are now in significant trouble, or have
already disappeared.
Let’s take a closer look at the telecom industry,
which is quantitatively much more important than
thedotcomindustry.FromDecember1990through
A
recurring topic of debate among
monetary policymakers and academic
experts for a decade and more is
whether, and under what conditions,
a central bank should adjust policy in an effort
to affect the direction of the stock market. This
issue arose initially in the context of the stock
market boom in Japan in the late 1980s and the
subsequent market decline in the 1990s. Not
only did the Japanese stock market decline, but
also the Japanese economy has suffered from an
almost continuous stagnation since the early
1990s. In the United States, the stock market
boom after 1995, and especially after the fall of
1998 until the early part of 2000, raises the same
issue. Given that the U.S. economy’s growth has
been near zero this year, it is natural to ask
whether tempering the prior stock market and
economic boom might have reduced the diffi-
culties the economy has faced this year.
I’m going to discuss this issue as carefully as
I can, but in a broader context of asset prices in
general. Although the stock market and business
high-tech investment are the focus of attention
today, 10 years ago the real estate market was the
issue. The parallels are striking—today, declining
stock prices, weak business investment, distressed
stock market investors—10 years ago, declining
real estate prices, weak construction spending,
and distressed lenders.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their com-
ments, especially Robert Rasche, director of
Research, and Frank Schmid, economist in theMarch 2000, the Nasdaq Telecommunications
Index increased by almost 1300 percent, whereas
the Wilshire 5000 stock market index increased
by about 360 percent. The increased importance
of the telecom industry in the stock market was
accompanied by a near doubling of the industry’s
share in real GDP from 1990 to 2000. In April 2000,
the Nasdaq Telecommunications Index began a
12-month decline in which it shed 60 percent.
Bankruptcies and restructuring accompanied the
decline in stock market valuation; there were plant
closures and significant layoffs. As the telecom
industry shrinks, there seems little doubt there
was a misallocation of resources in the late 1990s.
The telecom euphoria was widespread. The stock
market was part of this euphoria, and the distorted
asset price signals from the stock market permitted
the industry to raise capital easily and cheaply,
which certainly contributed to the over-expansion.
From what we now know, it is easy to question
the effectiveness of the stock market in allocating
scarce resources to their most efficient use. Could
the Federal Reserve have prevented such waste
of resources and the accompanying losses to
investors? This is not an easy question, but obvi-
ously an important one. The question is not easy
because any time an enterprise fails we can say
that there was a mistake. The issue is whether
we can reliably identify such cases in advance.
I’m going to embed my stock market analysis
in a broader analysis of asset prices in general.
There is a multitude of other types of assets in
the economy besides stocks, and many of these
assets are every bit as important as equities. As
of the end of the first quarter of this year, data for
the United States show that the total market value
of equities was about $14.9 trillion, bonds about
$14.6 trillion, and household real estate about
$11.3 trillion. Although the stock market is highly
visible because of its extensive minute-by-minute
reporting, the same sort of policy issues arise in
these other asset markets. Should the central bank
act to temper a housing boom, or a commercial
real estate boom, or a bond market boom? The




The central bank implements monetary policy
through the financial markets, and so policy
implementation is a logical place to begin a care-
ful analysis of my topic. Most fundamentally,
the aim of monetary policy is to create liquidity
at the rate required to keep the rate of inflation
low and stable, averaged over a period of several
years. Monetary policy can also vary the rate of
liquidity creation in the short run to help stabilize
employment and output growth.
To implement policy, the Federal Reserve
sets a target for the federal funds rate, which is
the price of overnight inter-bank loans. Market
expectations as to the future path of the effective
federal funds rate tie down the yields of short-
maturity Treasury securities, and those in turn
affect long-term Treasury bond yields and yields
in the corporate bond and mortgage markets.
Bond prices, of course, move inversely to bond
yields. Bond prices are one influence on equity
and real-estate prices.
The transmission of monetary policy actions
to the economy works through many channels,
but I’ll mention two that are especially relevant
in the context of this lecture. All else equal, a
lower bond yield will tend to raise stock market
valuations. As the cost of capital decreases, more
investment projects become profitable, which
encourages increases in capital spending. A sec-
ond effect arises because changes in stock market
valuation also affect household wealth and thus,
possibly, consumption expenditures. The magni-
tude and timing of these effects are uncertain,
which is one of the things that makes monetary
policy management a challenge.
THE INFORMATIONAL ROLE OF
THE TREASURY MARKET
When analyzing the implementation of mon-
etary policy and how policy effects are transmitted
to the economy through changes in asset prices,
clarity requires assuming “all other things being
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That fact opens up the possibility that the behav-
ior of asset prices contains information about how
other things are changing. Such information can
be invaluable in adjusting monetary policy
appropriately.
A particularly clear and important example
of information embedded in asset prices is infor-
mation on inflation expectations and the real rate
of interest. The real rate of interest is the return
on an asset after taking account of inflation. Today,
we are fortunate to have excellent information
on inflation expectations and the real yield on
Treasury bonds from trading in Treasury Inflation-
Protected Securities, known in the market as
“TIPS.” These bonds, first issued by the Treasury
in 1997, contain a provision that increases their
principal and every semiannual interest payment
by the increase in the consumer price index. TIPS,
therefore, completely protect the investor from
the effects of inflation and the yield on the bonds
isbydefinitionarealyield.Thedifferencebetween
the yield on a TIPS bond and a conventional bond
provides a measure of the market’s expectation
of future inflation. For example, last Thursday
the TIPS bond maturing April 2029 had a yield
of 3.41 percent while a conventional Treasury
bond maturing August 2029 had a yield of 5.46
percent. Ignoring the trivial difference between
the April and August maturity dates 28 years in
the future, these two bonds will turn out to have
identical yields if the inflation rate between now
and 2029 averages 2.05 percent, the difference
between the two quoted yields. As a first approx-
imation, we can say that these two asset markets
are providing us with the information that
investors expect that the inflation rate will aver-
age 2.05 percent over the next 28 years.
The TIPS spread has fluctuated a bit in
recent years, but it is safe to say that the absence
of any significant trend in the spread provides
convincing evidence of the market’s continuing
confidence that the Federal Reserve will pursue
policies that will keep the rate of inflation rela-
tively low for years to come. That is an important
piece of information, highly relevant to the con-
duct of monetary policy.
Because low and stable inflation is a key
objective of monetary policy, the TIPS spread
provides important evidence on whether the
market believes the Fed will be successful. The
spread does not reflect a judgment one way or
the other as to whether the current rate of liquid-
ity growth, or the current federal funds rate, is
appropriate but rather that the Fed will make
whatever adjustments in policy are required to
keep inflation low on average in future years.
Should the TIPS spread start to move convinc-
ingly higher, in my judgment it would be impor-
tant for the Federal Reserve to act to ensure that
policy became less expansionary. Or, if we were
convinced that the market was simply making a
mistake in its judgment, it would be important
to explain to the market the nature of the mis-
take.
Perhaps less well appreciated, the real yield
is itself a valuable piece of information. One meas-
ure of how the thrust of monetary policy is chang-
ing is the direction of change in the real yield.
When the central bank wants policy to be more
expansionary, in general it wants to see the real
yield fall, all other things being equal. Between
May 2000 and last Thursday, the yield on the
TIPS bond maturing in 2029 fell from 3.97 per-
cent to 3.41 percent. Just to be sure that I do not
leave a mistaken impression, however, I hasten
to add that the real yield in an economy is not
determined primarily by monetary policy but
instead by the interaction of the real rate of return
on physical capital and available savings—by
“productivity and thrift” to use the classic
terminology.
Before TIPS were available in the marketplace,
we would have observed that the conventional
Treasury bond maturing in 2029 had gone from
6.28 percent in May 2000 to 5.46 percent last
Thursday. To decide how much of the change in
the nominal yield on conventional bonds reflected
a change in the real yield and how much a change
in inflation expectations, we would have had to
rely on survey data on inflation expectations,
have estimated a model of some sort, or made an
educated guess on how the two components of
the nominal yield were changing.
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from the TIPS market illustrates a more general
point: We are able to extract useful information
from a number of new markets, such as futures
and options markets, that is extremely valuable
for improving the information base necessary for
more effective monetary policy. I don’t want to
get too far afield, but will offer one more illustra-
tion of this point: Trading in distant crude oil
futures contracts helps us to understand the
market’s best guess about the probable future
direction of energy prices. That information helps
us to understand whether a run-up of oil prices
might indicate a developing long-term inflation
problem or is likely a temporary phenomenon.
THE INFORMATIONAL ROLE OF
THE STOCK MARKET
Let me now turn to the stock market. It is fair
to say that many questions surrounding the equity
market are not well understood. The dearth of
knowledge in this area limits its role as a provider
of information for monetary policy decisions.
The key theoretical principle here is that the
value of a stock is based on expected growth of
the company’s earnings, the riskiness of the com-
pany, and some other factors that are not central
to my analysis. Actual earnings growth changes
over time and so do expectations. Empirical
studies show that changes in actual earnings
growth account only for a fraction of the changes
in stock prices. The issue is the extent to which
the remainder of changes in stock prices can be
attributed to reasoned and well-informed expec-
tations about future earnings growth and the
extent to which we should conclude that stock
prices are “irrational.”
Much of the time, I believe, stock price
changes do reflect reasoned information about
future earnings growth. Thus, my first instinct is
to interpret stock market changes as reflecting
probable changes in future earnings, which in
turn may reflect emerging trends in the economy.
Moreover, an environment of rising stock prices
is ordinarily one in which companies can more
readily raise funds in the market, which supports
higher business capital spending. Conversely,
declining stock prices may portend weaker capi-
tal spending. This information is obviously rele-
vant for monetary policy.
Unfortunately, stock prices have a significant
overlay of noise—uninformative, short-run fluc-
tuations—that makes it highly problematic to put
much weight on the stock market in reaching
judgments about the appropriate course of mon-
etary policy. Moreover, it does seem that some
changes in market prices reflect an irrational
component.
I do not believe that anyone will ever find
simple, straight-forward measures of the irrational
component or regularities that will permit us to
determine reliably that the stock market is signifi-
cantly over- or under-valued. Investment success
is just not that easy. For example, the P/E ratio
for the S&P 500 stock index reached a peak in
1991 that was higher than any other earlier P/E
peak since World War II and yet the stock market
enjoyed a tremendous boom in the years that
followed.
Every time the stock market declines signifi-
cantly, it is not hard to find someone who “pre-
dicted” the decline. The episode we are currently
living through is no different. Shortly before the
market peaked in March 2000, Robert Shiller, a
respected finance scholar from Yale University,
published a book entitled Irrational Exuberance.
He concluded that the U.S. stock market was
poised for a sharp decline. Shiller’s book is an
effort to better understand the market by drawing
on insights from psychology as well as economics,
and he illustrated many of his ideas by referring
to the state of the market in 1999.
Where I come out on these issues is that the
state of knowledge is so incomplete that it is fool-
hardy for me to form genuine convictions as to
when the stock market is over- or under-priced.
I may have vague, gut feelings from time to time,
but I do not trust such feelings to form a basis for
monetary policy decisions. Moreover, I am con-
vinced that as scholarly work on the stock market
improves our understanding, that work will influ-
ence market behavior and help to reduce the
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still be left with a large range of uncertainty in
any given circumstances.
In summary, the behavior of the stock market
has never been easy to decipher. I am convinced
that there is useful information in the market,
but also that it is always necessary to be very
skeptical. In my mind, the stock market alone
never provides reliable information but it can be
very useful in supplementing or reinforcing
information from other sources.
SHOULD THE STOCK MARKET
BE A DIRECT OBJECT OF
FEDERAL RESERVE POLICY?
I’ve argued that it is devilishly difficult to
extract information from the stock market useful
for monetary policy. The converse of this propo-
sition is that any particular market move may be
fully justified—it is just not easy to tell. Clearly,
it would be a mistake for the central bank to
attempt to roll back a market move that was in
fact fully justified. That is a very good reason for
the central bank not to target the market directly.
The central bank should leave this kind of judg-
ment to market mechanisms.
Suppose, though, that you do not share this
view. The problem then is to figure out what the
Federal Reserve could do to push the stock market
up or down. In the late 1990s, some proposed
that the Fed should use margin requirements,
which have been held stable at 50 percent since
1974. The argument went that higher margin
requirements would make it more costly for
investors to finance stock ownership by borrow-
ing from brokers, and that the increase in stock
prices would consequently slow or stop. From
my perspective, the margin requirement is a haz-
ardous policy tool because little is known about
the potential consequences of such a move. There
is a spectrum of conceivable consequences associ-
ated with a change in margin requirements: On
one end of the spectrum lies complete ineffective-
ness, and on the other end lies a change in stock
prices far larger than anticipated or desired. Either
result may damage the Fed’s credibility. I reject
as unwise in the extreme a call to “do something”
without any reasonable basis for estimating the
probable effects of the action.
If changing margin requirements does not
have a predictable result, what about changing
the target rate for federal funds? It is very impor-
tant to understand that the Federal Reserve has
only one monetary policy instrument, which is
the federal funds target rate or, more generally,
the rate at which the Fed provides liquidity to
the economy. A widely known result from con-
trol theory states that, with one instrument, the
policymaker can at best achieve one policy objec-
tive. That objective, in my view, ought to be a
low and stable rate of inflation. As a matter of
logic, therefore, pursuing a separate stock market
objective means compromises of some sort on
the inflation objective. Clearly, targeting the stock
market might come at a high price. Once the
Federal Reserve compromises on its price stability
goal, inflation and inflation expectations build
up. Experience shows that inflation expectations
are persistent, and inflation fighting tends to entail
recessions. Because permitting the economy to
run off track has negative consequences for the
stock market, any effort to target the stock market
is likely to be self-defeating.
TARGETING THE STOCK MARKET:
A QUALIFICATION
On rare occasions, one or more asset markets
may go into a free fall that calls for a central bank
response. October 19, 1987, was such a case. The
chaotic decline in stock prices that day threatened
the market mechanism itself. A somewhat similar,
but less extreme and less dramatic, episode
occurred in the fall of 1998, when a number of
asset markets were disrupted over several weeks
following the Russian default and near failure of
Long Term Capital Management. I addressed this
subject in London last November in my Henry
Thornton Lecture, entitled “Expectations.”
What Role for Asset Prices in U.S. Monetary Policy?
5The diversity of these cases, and the unique
circumstances in each case, is well illustrated by
adding two more entries to the list I’ve mentioned.
One was the failure of the Penn Central Railroad
in 1970, which led to extensive problems in the
commercial paper market. Another was the near
failure and bailout of Continental Illinois Bank
in 1984, which disrupted the bank CD market. A
contrary case, which nicely illustrates the general
principle, was the failure of Drexel-Burnham-
Lambert, a major securities firm, in 1990. Neither
the Federal Reserve nor any other agency
responded to this failure, and the market absorbed
the news without significant problems. The gen-
eral principle at work in these cases is that the
central bank may need to respond when market
mechanisms themselves are damaged by what-
ever event has occurred.
AN IMPORTANT DISTINCTION:
OFFSETTING THE EFFECTS OF
ASSET PRICE CHANGES
I’ve emphasized that, except for the rare
qualification of market disruptions so severe
that market mechanisms themselves are at risk, I
am convinced that the central bank ought not to
target asset prices themselves. But, that does not
mean that asset prices are irrelevant to monetary
policy and that they might not induce a policy
response.
Suppose the Federal Reserve implemented
policy with a policy instrument other than the
federal funds target rate—I’ll call it Instrument X.
How would Instrument X behave? How would
interest rates behave?
To keep the rate of inflation low and stable,
the Fed would adjust X from time to time to off-
set whatever disturbances threatened to push the
rate of inflation off its desired low and steady
path. As a consequence of changes in X, and as
a consequence of changes elsewhere in the econ-
omy, interest rates would rise and fall, much the
way gasoline prices rise and fall as a consequence
of actions by OPEC, seasonal patterns in demand,
refinery fires, and so forth.
The Fed does not in fact employ an Instru-
ment X. Instead, it adjusts its target for the federal
funds rate in an attempt to reproduce, more or
less, how that rate would change in response to
market forces if the Fed actually employed Instru-
ment X. That means that the Fed is prepared to
adjust the federal funds target in response to
events of all kinds that might push the economy
off its desired track. The Fed may respond, there-
fore, to stock market fluctuations if doing so is
necessary to offset the effects of those fluctuations.
This is a distinction with a difference. At any
given time, many different impulses are affecting
the economy. If the stock market is falling in a
sustained way, which by itself would tend to
reduce the economy’s upward momentum, but
the sum total of all other factors is still generating
excessive upward pressure, then it would be
appropriate for the Fed to tighten policy despite
the possible adverse effect on stock prices. Target-
ing the economy and targeting the stock market
per se are two very different things.
The stock market is relevant for monetary
policy in at least two different ways. First, for
the household sector, a depreciation in the stock
market represents a decline in personal wealth.
Although lower personal wealth implies lower
consumption capacity, the evidence does not
indicate that the influence of the stock market
on personal consumption is quick and highly
predictable. Despite the uncertainty, given the
potentially harmful effect of stock market depre-
ciation on consumption, the Fed obviously cannot
ignore this issue. A stock market decline makes
me especially sensitive to the possibility that
consumption might be adversely affected, and if
such an effect is supported by other data, I am
more inclined to favor policy action than I other-
wise would be.
Second, for the business sector, the stock
market affects the capacity of firms to raise capital
to support new investment spending. Here again,
the effects are not highly predictable but com-
bined with other evidence the behavior of the
stock market can contribute to the overall assess-
ment of the outlook for investment.
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succeeded in offsetting potential damage from
an abrupt disruption of the securities markets was
the Russian default on domestic government
debt in the summer of 1998. The Federal Reserve
swiftly responded with monetary easing to pre-
vent disruptions in the financial sector from
spilling over into the real economy. The drop in
the S&P 500 stock index by about 10 percent in
the third quarter of 1998 was followed by a more
than 20 percent increase in the stock market index
in the subsequent quarter. Economic growth
continued unabated. The rate cuts in the fall of
1998 were subsequently reversed and inflation
remained subdued. The episode illustrates that
policy actions to prevent financial market disrup-
tion from spilling over to the general economy
need not conflict with achieving the primary
goal of low and stable inflation.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Asset markets play a central role in a market
economy. Policymakers cannot and ought not
ignore these markets. Making effective use of
information from asset markets and offsetting, to
the extent possible, adverse effects on the general
economy flowing from asset price changes are
important ingredients of a successful monetary
policy.
For reasons I’ve tried to explain with some
care, I believe it is very important that the Federal
Reserve not take a position per se on the level of
prices in asset markets, especially the stock mar-
ket. It is very easy to be wrong about the appro-
priate level; this judgment ought to be left to the
market. That is the kind of judgment that markets
excel in making, at least relative to the judgments
made by public officials.
I want to finish on a personal note. During
the late 1990s, and especially 1999, there were
elements of market behavior that made me very
uncomfortable. The issue was not just the run-up
of prices but also the expansion of speculative
trading, especially day-trading by apparently
inexperienced individuals. The lack of attention
by analysts to earnings prospects of some com-
panies was troubling. At the same time, the mar-
ket seemed vulnerable to triggering events that
might induce a sharp decline. As troubling as this
situation was, it did not seem appropriate for me
to discuss the market. Insofar as any comments I
might make would have an effect on the market,
I had no idea what these effects might be.
Indeed, the market environment was such
that I did not want to utter the words “stock” and
“market” back to back in a speech, even to dis-
cuss the issues at a fairly general level as I have
in this lecture. It is unfortunate, I think, when a
topic seems so sensitive that even a general dis-
cussion is inadvisable. But today’s environment
is calmer, and I hope that I have been successful
in establishing the critically important distinc-
tion between targeting the stock market itself
and offsetting undesired effects of stock market
changes. The job of the central bank is keep the
rate of inflation low and steady and contribute to
sustained economic growth. Policy actions will
affect asset markets from time to time, but in my
view these effects ought always to be side effects
of the central bank pursuing its responsibility for
the general health of the economy.
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